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A Primer on Administrative Rules and
Rule-Making in Kentucky*
By EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
Promulgation of regulations is perhaps the most important
administrative mechanism for implementing legislative policy.
As early as 1909, the Kentucky Court upheld the constitution-
ality of agency authority to impose binding conditions on licen-
sees.' In Kentucky, agency regulations have been held to be
enforceable by civil fines2 and, more recently, jail terms.3 The
Kentucky Court has allowed the delegation of rule-making au-
thority on the ground that agency rules operate by "filling in
the necessary details"' of a legislative enactment or that they
constitute "the finding of certain facts upon which laws may
depend to become operative in given instances. '5 Regardless of
the underlying rationale, it is now well-settled in Kentucky
that agencies may exercise rule-making authority to impose
binding obligations on all private parties within the jurisdic-
tion of a particular regulatory scheme.
Despite the growing importance of agency regulation, the
Kentucky legislature has yet to enact a comprehensive admin-
istrative procedure act for the state. This article sets out the
* Copyright 1978, Edward H. Ziegler, Jr.
** Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Ken-
tucky University. A.B. 1970, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1973, University of Ken-
tucky; LL.M. 1975, George Washington University.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Edward Rudd, a student at Salmon
P. Chase College of Law, for his assistance in the research and preparation of this
article.
State Racing Comm'n v. Latonia Agricultural Ass'n., 123 S.W. 681 (Ky. 1909).
Board of Health v. Kollman, 160 S.W. 1052 (Ky. 1913).
Kentucky Milk Marketing and Anti-Monopoly Comm'n v. Borden Co., 456
S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970).
Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 S.W.2d 361, 365
(Ky. 1954).
3 State Racing Comm'n v. Latonia Agricultural Ass'n, 123 S.W. 681, 687 (Ky.
1909).
' An analysis of the development of Kentucky case law upholding the delegation
of powers to administrative agencies is found in Ziegler, Legitimizing The Administra-
tive State: The Judicial Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Kentucky, 4
N. Ky. L. Ray. 87 (1977).
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present statutory and common law in Kentucky regarding
administrative rules and rule-making. Reference will also be
made to relevant federal and non-Kentucky state cases. It is
intended to serve not only as a research tool for private attor-
neys, state officials, and students, but also as a small step
toward further development and clarification of Kentucky
administrative law. Much more needs to be written as the de-
velopment of administrative government progresses in Ken-
tucky.7
I. RULE-MAKING VS. DUE PROCESS ADJUDICATION
A fundamental distinction must be made between admin-
istrative rule-making and administrative adjudication. The
distinction is important for determining whether the four-
teenth amendment requires notice and the opportunity to be
heard prior to agency action.8 Notice and the opportunity to be
heard are only required prior to agency adjudicative action, not
prior to agency rule-making.9 Any procedural requirement, in-
cluding a hearing, that may apply to agency rule-making will
be imposed by statute only.10
7 It has been suggested that the most significant change in our legal system during
the twentieth century has been the tremendous growth of discretionary power dele-
gated to administrative agencies. FTC v. Rubberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). On this point, consider the following statement from R.
LoRCH, DEMOCRATIC PROcEss ANn ADMINISTRATV LAw 9 (1969):
Among the revolutions of our time is an administrative revolution. Adminis-
trators are no longer merely administrators in the old sense of the word. They
are now heavily involved in doing what the Fathers of the Republic surely
would have called legislative and judicial. Anyone who still believes that law-
making is mostly done by legislatures, or that dispute settling is mostly done
by courts, is far behind the times.
See generally F. M. MARx, THE ADMNmmTRATVE STATE (1957); D. WALDO, THE ADMNiS-
TRATIVE STATE (1948).
8 Notice and opportunity to be heard are required at trial-type evidentiary hear-
ings. A listing of the usual procedural requirements at a due process hearing is set out
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
, Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). For Kentucky cases acknowledging this distinc-
tion, see Harrison's Sanitarium, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't. of Health, 417 S.W.2d
137, 138 (Ky. 1967); Sanitation Dist. No. 1 v. Campbell, 249 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1952).
,0 E.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1197 (1978) (a court should not impose its own notions of proper
rule-making procedure on an agency since an agency, when engaged in rule-making,
is bound only by procedures required by statute or the agency's own regulations). See,
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The label that an agency chooses to attach to its action
does not control whether due process requires a prior hearing."1
Whether agency action is rule-making or adjudicative depends
on the specific nature of and the factual basis for its proposed
determination. 2 It is often stated that rule-making is making
law to apply in the future, while adjudication is the application
of law to a present or past fact situation. However, that defini-
tion is not adequate in all cases. It is probably safer to state
that any agency action which is directed toward a particular
individual and which grants or denies a benefit or imposes an
obligation or penalty on individual grounds is likely to consti-
tute adjudicative action. It follows that a regulation, though
technically of general applicability, may still be adjudicative
action if it is directed toward a particular individual and fac-
tually supported upon individual grounds. 3 As the Kentucky
Court has stated in an analogous context, a regulation "may
be valid as to one state of facts and invalid as to another."
4
Also, the distinction cannot always be based on the fact
that the administrative body is traditionally characterized as
"legislative"' 5 and not "judicial." In 1971, the Kentucky Court
found that a putatively "legislative" body (a railroad commis-
sion) had engaged in adjudicative action and that an eviden-
tiary hearing was required prior to that action. In that case,
the Court stated that if agency action "is used as a vehicle not
to make generally applicable law, rules or policy, but to decide
whether a particular individual as a result of a factual situation
peculiar to his situation is or is not entitled to some form of
relief, then the so-called legislative body must act in accord-
ance with the basic requirements of due process."' 7 Thus, if an
e.g., the Kentucky statutory provisions for notice and hearing before promulgation of
administration regulations, discussed at text accompanying notes 129-43 infra.
1 See American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 843 (1966).
11 See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
13 Id.
"1 Sanitation Dist. No. 1 v. Campbell, 249 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Ky. 1952).
11 Cf. City of Middlesboro v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 252 S.W.2d 680 (Ky.
1952) (Railroad Commission adjudication characterized as exercise of "legislative
function").
,1 City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971) (trial-type eviden-
tiary hearing required prior to legislative body's decision on rezoning particular parcel
of land).
17 Id. at 178.
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agency rule is not directed toward a particular individual and
the rule is based on "legislative" and not "adjudicative"
facts,"8 no prior due process hearing is required.
II. AGENCY REGULATIONS: AuTHoRIrrY AND EECT
A determination of the authority that is necessary to issue
a regulation and the binding effect of a regulation will depend
on the type of regulation in question. An agency regulation is
defined in Kentucky as "each statement of general applicabil-
ity issued by an administrative body that implements, inter-
prets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of any administrative
body."' 9 This definition of a "regulation" includes the three
general types of agency rules: (1) substantive regulations; (2)
procedural regulations; and (3) interpretive regulations.
A. Agency Authority
1. Substantive Regulations
Substantive regulations are those which impose obliga-
tions on private individuals or businesses. The authority to
issue substantive regulations is usually held to exist only if
there is an express grant of rule-making authority to the
agency.2 Such power may not be implied from a*general dele-
gation of regulatory authority. Since valid substantive rules
have the force of law and are binding on private parties and the
courts, our constitutional system of government dictates that
11 Professor Davis describes "adjudicative facts" as those which relate directly to
the immediate parties and to the question of who did what. Davis, An Approach to
the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. Rzv. 364, 402
(1942).
" Ky. REv. STAT. § 13.080(3) (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Phelps v. Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1975)
(by implication). At least one state has held that authority to issue substantive regula-
tions may be implied from a general delegation of authority. See City of East Chicago
v. Sigler, 36 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. 1941). This case is clearly inconsistent with the funda-
mental principle of administrative law that an agency, being a creature of statute,
possesses only those powers conferred on it by statute. See Department of Motor
Transp. v. Ech Miller Transfer Co., 249 S.W.2d 802 (Ky. 1952); Goodpaster v. South-
ern Ins. Agency, 169 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1943); C.C.T. Equipment Co. v. The Hertz Corp.,
123 S.E.2d 802, 807 (N.C. 1962).
[Vol. 67
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rule-making power should exist only if it is expressly conferred
by statute.
The Kentucky Court has applied this rule in numerous
cases.2' In cases in which the Court has upheld the exercise of
substantive rule-making power, it has always pointed to an
express statutory provision conferring such authority on the
agency.Y In Lovern v. Brown, 23 the Court stated that "the va-
lidity of a rule or regulation depends upon whether the admin-
istrative agency was empowered to adopt the particular rule."IA
Similar statements in other cases indicate that the Court will
not imply substantive rule-making power from a general grant
of administrative or regulatory authority.1
Although the grant of substantive rule-making power must
rest upon an express statutory delegation, such a provision in
a statute need not specifically authorize the issuance of
"substantive" rules.Y The cases in Kentucky clearly indicate
that a general grant of rule-making authority (not regulatory
authority) includes the power to issue substantive regula-
tions.28 Also, a general grant of rule-making power will usually
be liberally construed by the Kentucky Court to authorize the
promulgation of any substantive rule which appears to be rea-
sonably related to the intent or the purpose of the delegating
statute.2' The limitation imposed by the Court on the exercise
21 See, e.g., Yeary v. Union Transfer & Storage Co., 209 S.W.2d 77 .(Ky. 1948);
Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Board of Prison Comm'rs, 170 S.W. 941 (Ky. 1914).
2 See, e.g., Southeastern Displays, Inc. v. Ward, 414 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1967);
Dicken v. Kentucky State Board of Educ., 199 S.W.2d 977 (Ky. 1947); State Racing
Comm'n v. Latonia Agricultural Ass'n, 123 S.W. 681 (Ky. 1909).
" 390 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965).
"Id. at 449.
"Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health v. Haunz, 451 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky.
1969) ("the regulations were adopted pursuant to enabling legislation"); Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd. v. Hunter, 331 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1960) ("statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated").
n This is especially so since the legislature repealed KRS § 13.081 in 1974. 1974
Ky. Acts, ch. 73, § 7. This statute provided broad rule-making authority to all state
agencies.
" See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
"E.g., Lovern v. Brown, 390 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965); State Racing Comm'n v.
Latonia Agricultural Ass'n., 123 S.W. 681 (Ky. 1909).
" See, e.g., Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1957); Kentucky Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd. v. Klein, 192 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1946).
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of the power requires only that such a rule not "amend, alter,
enlarge or limit" the express terms of a statute."
2. Procedural Rules
Procedural regulations set out the agency's rules of prac-
tice. Such regulations are likely to regulate the filing of appli-
cations, the filing of petitions for intervention, the conduct of
hearings, and the procedure for internal agency appeals. The
authority to adopt procedural rules is usually considered to be
an implied agency power." Administrative agencies possess the
authority to fashion rules of procedure in order to carry out
their statutory duties so long as the procedures are not incon-
sistent with those duties.3 2 In Kentucky, an exemption to such
implied authority prevents an agency from adopting proce-
dural rules that provide for reconsideration of its final deci-
sions. The Court has held that authority to create such a rule
must be delegated by statute.13 As stated in the Phelps v.
Sallee,3 in which such a procedural rule of the Department of
Banking and Securities was held invalid, "an administrative
agency does not have any inherent or implied power to reopen
or reconsider a final decision and. . . such power does not exist
where it is not specifically conferred upon the agency by the
express terms of the statute creating the agency. ' ,
3. Interpretive Regulations
Interpretive regulations are agency statements that inform
the public and the courts of the agency's understanding of
31 E.g., Johnson v. Correll, 332 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1960); Hankins Appliance Co. v.
Goebel, 284 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1955); Goodpaster v. Southern Ins. Agency, 169 S.W.2d
1 (Ky. 1943).
3' E.g., Philadelphia Elec. Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 156 F.2d 648 (3d
Cir. 1946); Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach, 76 N.E.2d 79 (Ohio 1947).
32 See Bandeen v. Howard, 299 S.W.2d 249 (Ky.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 813
(1957); Jacobs v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 299 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1957) (by
implication); Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 271 S.W.2d
361 (Ky. 1954).
3 Hennessy v. Bischoff, 240 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1951).
u 529 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1975).
31 Id. at 365. However, an agency has authority to reconsider and change its orders
during the time it retains control over any question under submission to it, even if such
orders relate to the matter currently before the agency. Union Light, Heat & Power
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1954).
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either a particular statute the agency is authorized to enforce
or of one of its own regulations. The power to adopt interpre-
tive regulations is generally considered to be impliedly granted
to an agency in a general grant of regulatory authority.
37
4. Changes in Regulations
A statutory grant of rule-making authority to an agency
necessarily confers on the agency the power to repeal, change,
or amend its regulations as the agency deems necessary to ef-
fectuate its statutory duties.3 Changes in regulations must
comply with applicable rule-making procedures and such
changes, like all rules, are generally held to have prospective
effect only.
39
B. Effect of Regulations
It is a settled principle of administrative law that a valid
substantive or procedural rule has the full force and effect of
law.'" Such a regulation will be treated by courts as if it were
3' See J.B. Blanton Co. v. Lowe, 415 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1967).
1 Since an interpretive rule merely clarifies an agency's interpretation of a statute
or regulation and does not determine issues of law or fact or impose substantive obliga-
tions on private parties, it is no more than a publicized opinion of the agency's legal
staff. See American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316 F.2d 419,
421-422 (D.C. Cir. 1963). An agency, therefore, is considered to have inherent authority
to issue such rules. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137-138 (1944) (interpre-
tive guidelines considered by court though no delegation to agency of rule-making
authority); K.C. DAvis, AomiNTmTiv LAw TExt 126-131 (3d ed. 1975).
31 E.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (lst Cir. 1974).
3' The general legislative principle that a statute will not have retroactive effect
unless expressly stated otherwise seems to apply to administrative rules as well. See
KRS § 446.080. A regulation may be given retroactive effect if such an intent is clearly
expressed or necessarily implied in the rule and the retroactive effect of the rule is not
unreasonable under the circumstances. This is clearly the view in federal courts and
appears to be shared by the courts in Kentucky. See General Telephone Co. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 846, 863 (5th Cir. 1971); City of Covington v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1,
301 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1957). See generally 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and
Procedure § 107 (1951). Cf. note 55 infra.
" E.g., Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 S.W.2d
361 (Ky. 1954) (company bound by rule as if it were statute enacted by legislature);
Page v. Board of Liquor Control, 212 N.W.2d 125 (Ohio 1954); Reeves v. Fenley's
Model Dairy, 235 S.W.2d 995 (Ky. 1951) (substantive rules binding on private party).
Formerly, KRS § 13.081 provided that "regulations shall have the full force of
law." Although this statute was repealed in 1974 (1974 Ky. Acts. ch. 73, § 7), the
Kentucky Court is likely to continue to follow its earlier holdings.
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embodied in a legislative enactment. 1 The far-reaching effect
of this principle is indicated by the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Howard." There the Court held that a
state agency regulation constituted "the law of the state" as
that phrase is used in a federal criminal statute. In Kentucky,
valid agency rules have "binding effect" and a violation of the
rules could result in civil liability or criminal penalties.
1. Binding Effect
Valid substantive and procedural rules will be deemed by
the Kentucky Court to have "binding effect" on all private
parties within their scope. 3 Violation of a substantive rule may
be sanctioned by a civil fine, jail term, or an administrative
remedy such as license revocation." In this respect, the
"binding effect" of a valid substantive rule is identical to that
of a statute or city ordinance.
A valid substantive or procedural rule is also binding on
the courts. A court in Kentucky is not free to substitute its
judgment for that of an agency regarding the wisdom or necess-
ity of such a regulation. 5 If a substantive or procedural rule is
reasonable, within the scope of agency authority, and promul-
gated in accordance with required procedure, a court in Ken-
tucky is bound to apply the rule as if it were a legislative
enactment."
Substantive and procedural rules are also binding on the
administrative agencies that promulgate them. Such rules
1 Agency rules "have the same effect as statutes or ordinances enacted directly
by the legislative body from which the administrative agency derives its authority."
Reitze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Ky. 1970).
352 U.S. 212 (1957).
10 Harrison's Sanitarium v. Kentucky Dept. of Health, 417 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1967);
Reeves v. Fenley's Model Dairy, 235 S.W.2d 995 (Ky. 1951).
" See Kentucky Milk Marketing and Anti-Monopoly Comm'n v. Borden Co., 456
S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970) (delegating statute and implementing regulations held valid
when regulations backed by sanctions of monetary fine and jail term); Brown v. Bau-
mer, 191 S.W.2d 255 (.y. 1945) (loss of liquor license for violation of agency regula-
tion).
"See, e.g., Lovern v. Brown, 390 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965); Sanitation Dist. No. 1
v. Campbell, 249 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1952).
1, See Kentucky State Bd. of Business Schools v. Electronic Computer Program-
ming Inst., Inc., 453 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1970).
" See, e.g., United States v. Wilbur, 427 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1970); Barash v.
Seaton, 256 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Shearer v. Dailey, 226 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1950).
[Vol. 67
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may, of course, be changed or repealed by the agency." How-
ever, such a change must be made in compliance with applica-
ble rule-making procedures" and until a new rule becomes
effective, the agency may not waive or disregard existing
rules.ss Moreover, any change in an agency's regulations will
generally be given prospective effect only.5" In Shearer v.
Dailey,5" regulation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
fixed county quotas for retail package liquor licenses. The
Board granted a new license, exceeding the limit provided for
in the regulation. The Court held such action to be invalid,
stating, "the Board is bound by its own quota regulations, and
until such regulations have been effectively changed according
to law, it may not authorize the issuance of a new license in
excess of the limit so fixed."sO The Court concluded that
"[p]ermitting such a practice would acknowledge the arbi-
trary power of the Board to disregard its own regulations at will
and administer the law for preferred private persons '....
[T]he possibilities of abuse are too significant to be ignored." 54
Uniformity, stability, and fundamental fairness dictate that an
agency is estopped from disregarding or retroactively changing
its own regulations to fit the facts of a particular case.
"This authority is deemed to be implied by a general grant of rule-making au-
thority. E.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974); Curly's Dairy
Inc. v. State Dept. of Agriculture, 415 P.2d 740 (Ore. 1966).
" See KRS § 13.080(3) (Supp. 1976).
, Shearer v. Dailey, 226 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1950).
, As mentioned at note 39, supra, a regulation may be given retroactive effect if
such an intent is clearly expressed or necessarily implied in the rule and retroactive
application of the rule is not unreasonable under the circumstances. Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. United States, 511 F.2d 529 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (change in Navy procurement
regulations retroactively applied to earlier ship-building contract). Compare Mahler
v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (retroactive application of statute resulting in deportation
of alien for prior acts upheld) with Maceren v. District Director, Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., Los Angeles, Cal., 509 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1974) (retroactive
application of change in regulations to affect status of resident alien held unreason-
able).
Clearly, an agency regulation retroactively applied to impose a sanction on past
conduct that was lawful when performed would violate the prohibition of the ex post
facto clauses of the United States Constitution. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl.
1. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNsTrrIUONAL LAw 434-436 (1978).
For a discussion of the reasonableness of an agency and adjudicatory decision
retroactively overruling a decisional precedent, see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267 (1974).
52226 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1950).
I d. at 956.
. Id.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
An exception to the general rule that an agency may not
change its rules retroactively to fit the facts of a particular case
should exist, perhaps, when an extraordinary situation arises
and the action is necessary to protect an important public in-
terest.15 With respect to procedural rules, one court has held
that an administrative agency is not "a slave of its rules.""
However, in "a government of laws and not of men," the better
view by far is that expressed by Felix Frankfurter:
[I]f there is one thing that is established in the law of
administration, I take it that a (procedural) rule cannot be
repealed specifically to affect a case under consideration by
the administrative authorities; that is, if there is an existing
rule which protects certain rights, it violates every sense of
decency, which is the very heart of due process, to repeal that
protection, just for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of
the case.57
An agency is often required to follow its own procedures
even if they are not embodied in formal regulations. Courts
have estopped agencies from taking action inconsistent with
their "usual practice," with their procedures embodied in an
"internal order, '5 9 and even with their procedures set out in a
"news release."6 "
Interpretive rules lack the force and effect of law and are
generally considered not to be binding on private parties or
courts.6" Although great weight may be given to such a rule,
especially if it is long-standing or within an agency's technical
expertise,6 2 a court may exercise independent judgment with
respect to the meaning of statutory language. 3 The extent of
" For an example, a court is not likely to estop the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission from retroactively applying a change in its radiation protection regula-
tions to a particular nuclear utility if necessary to protect the public health.
" NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1950).
'1 Statement made when Mr. Frankfurter was counsel for petitioners in Colyer v.
Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D. Mass. 1920), rev'd sum nom. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F.
129 (1st Cir. 1922), quoted in B. ScHwARz, AnmmTRAxmv LAw: A CAsEmooK 253
(1977).
Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 223-24 (D.C.
Cir. 1959).
" Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
U United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811-13 (4th Cir. 1969).
" E.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
6 See J.B. Blanton Co. v. Lowe, 415 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1967).
63 Id.
[Vol. 67
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judicial deference to an interpretive rule will depend, in Justice
Jackson's words, "upon the thoroughness evident in its consid-
eration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control."6
Interpretive rules which explain an agency's understand-
ing of one of its own regulations, however, will often be binding
on a court if the rule is reasonable.A5 The Kentucky Court has
followed this approach" but the question in such a case seems
to be limited to the question of agency intent.67
Interpretive rules are generally not binding on the
agency." However, some courts in recent years have prevented
agencies from acting inconsistently with an officially adopted
interpretive rule." For the most part, though, courts continue
to hold that informal agency interpretations or advice provided
in response to a private party's request will generally not be
binding on an agency, especially when inconsistent with the
terms of an agency rule or the agency's governing statute.
7 0
2. Effect on Civil Liability
Since a valid administrative rule has the force and effect
of law,7' the Kentucky Court has held that a violation thereof
may constitute negligence per se.72 As stated in Kidd v. Price,
"noncompliance with applicable safety laws and regulations
which results in injuries they were designed to prevent consti-
tutes negligence. 7 3
"1 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
u E.g., Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak
Walton League of America, Inc., 423 U.S. 12 (1975).
" See J.B. Blanton Co. v. Lowe, 415 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1967).
hId.
u See Etter Grain Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1972).
" E.g., Justice v. Board of Educ., 351 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
, E.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Schuster v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962). See text accompanying
notes 89-109 infra.
21 E.g., Linkous v. Darch, 323 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. 1959).
72 E.g., Rietze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1970); Blue Grass Restaurant Co.
v. Franklin, 424 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1968); Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White, 208 S.W.2d
64 (Ky. 1948). A discussion of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery when suit
is based on a violation of a safety regulation is found in Comment,
Negligence-Violation of Safety Regulation as Negligence Per Se: The Perishable
Sanction, 62 Ky. L.J. 254 (1973).
" 461 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Ky. 1971).
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However, the doctrine will be applied only when all of the
following conditions are satisfied: (1) the rule must be enacted
for safety purposes and not just governmental convenience;7
(2) the injury sustained must be one that the regulation was
intended to prevent;75 (3) the injury must be sustained by a
person or by a property interest which the rule contemplated
protecting; 76 (4) the violation of the regulation must be the
proximate cause of the injury;7 and (5) the rule must be valid
in all respects.
78
On the other hand, a federal court sitting in Kentucky has
held that the maintenance of a building or instrumentality in
accordance with safety regulations is prima facie evidence of
the absence of negligence. 9 However, in the only Kentucky
case directly on point, Vaught's Administratrix v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 0 it Was held that compliance with safety regula-
tions is not controlling and should be used only "as a guide in
measuring the care exercised" by a defendant. 8'
7' E.g., Rietze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1970) (violation of plumbing
code); Vissman v. Koby, 309 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1958); Phoenix Amusement Co. v.
White, 208 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1948) (violation of fire code).
" Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White, 208 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1948).
" Kidd v. Price, 461 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1971) (landlord liable for injury to lessee's
employee); Reitze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1970) (landlord liable for injury
to tenant's invitee).
" Isbell v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 162 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Ky. 1958). See
Commonwealth v. Ragland Potter Co., 305 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1957).
11 Bostic v. East Construction Co., 497 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1974) (rule invalid since
vague and unintelligible); Linkous v. Darch, 323 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. 1959) (rule invalid
since beyond the scopd of agency authority).
,Isbell v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 162 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Ky. 1958).
296 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1956).
A Id. at 462.
Compliance with safety regulations will not excuse a landlord who has allowed
others to violate rules that apply to the landlord. In Reitze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d
613 (Ky. 1970), a landlord under a duty imposed by an administrative rule could not
avoid liability for violation of such rules because an independent contractor had vio-
lated the rules. "[W]e cannot hold that a landlord may shift to an independent
contractor the responsibility of compliance with laws designed for the physical safety
'and protection of his tenants." Id. at 617-18. The Rietze decision has been held not to
place liability on a landlord for injuries to the employees of independent contractors
injured on a landlord's premises. Courtney v. Island Creek Coal Co., 474 F.2d 468 (6th
Cir. 1973); Cochran v. International Harvester Co., 408 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Ky. 1975).
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Ill. AGENCY ADVICE
A. Declaratory Rulings
Administrative regulation is usually carried on under
broad and indeterminate delegations. Although rule-making
fills in the details of a regulatory scheme, legitimate questions
are likely to arise regarding the application of a statute or
agency regulation to a proposed private course of conduct. In
such a situation, a private party may seek an advance agency
ruling on the legality of the proposed action rather than violate
'the rule and risk the imposition of an agency sanction. Pur-
suant to such a request, an agency in Kentucky may issue a
formal declaratory order or ruling which sets out its opinion of
the legality of a planned transaction or course of conduct that
is within the scope of the agency's authority to regulate.
2
A declaratory order or ruling is often issued when an
agency wishes to terminate a controversy or to remove uncer-
tainty and rule-making is inappropriate because of the unique-
ness of the particular fact situation. In effect, it is a substitute
for formal adjudication which is impossible since the conduct
has not yet occurred. An agency is usually considered to have
absolute discretion to refuse to issue such an order.s Agency
refusal is generally not reviewable in the courts" since the deci-
sion will often be based on an agency's own uncertainty or
wariness of spelling out the exact letter of the law in order to
12 An agency in Kentucky appears to possess implied power to issue a declaratory
order or ruling. This view is apparent in Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure §
3.530(c) (1974) which provides that an informal or formal advisory opinion concerning
attorney ethics issued by the Kentucky Bar Association will be binding on that agency
so long as the attorney's petition for such an opinion "clearly, fairly, accurately and
completely states his contemplated professional act." No constitutional or statutory
provision expressly confers such authority on the Kentucky Bar Association. On the
implied power of an agency to issue declaratory rulings without specific statutory
authorization, see Electrolux Corp. v. Miller, 36 N.W.2d 633 (N.Y. 1941).
At the federal level, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554(e) (1976),
authorizes agency issuance of a declaratory order without a hearing on matters that
normally require an agency hearing. Many federal agencies now provide in their regu-
lations for the issuance of declaratory orders or binding advisory opinions. See M.
AsIMow, ADVICE To THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 141-186 (1973).
" However, an agency may by regulation provide that such an order "shall" be
issued upon request. See Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure § 3.530(a) (1974).
M E.g., W.J. Dillner Transfer Co. v. McAndrew, 226 F. Supp. 860 (W.D. Pa. 1963),
aff'd 328 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1964).
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encourage generous compliance. However, a declaratory order,
when issued, is usually reviewable in the courts, provided that
available administrative remedies have been exhausted. 5
It should be noted that declaratory rulings are expressly
exempted from formal rule-making procedures in Kentucky."
But a declaratory order or ruling, just as a regulation, is consid-
ered to be binding on an agency with respect to the submitted
facts until changed prospectively by the agency. 7 The declara-
tory ruling is considered to be the agency's formal and official
opinion in a specific case.8 The source of the order within the
agency must have been acting within the authorized scope of
his authority. For this reason, the request for a declaratory
order or ruling should be made to the head of the agency unless
a specific regulation or document clearly confers such authority
on an agency employee. Some agencies may have other names
for what is, in effect, a declaratory order or ruling. But, in the
absence of a specific statute or rule providing otherwise, a re-
quest should be styled as one for a declaratory order or ruling.
B. Estoppel and Agency Advice
When an agency has taken action, a question of estoppel
often arises if that action is inconsistent with earlier advice.
Normally, an agency will be estopped from taking action incon-
sistent with its own regulation.89 However, when agency action
is inconsistent with the agency's own prior advice, the Govern-
ment will not be estopped if the previous advice was unauthor-
ized."
1. Action Outside the Scope of Authority
The U.S. Supreme Court expressly held in the landmark
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 627 (1973).
KRS § 13.080(3)(b) (Supp. 1976).
'7 See United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5
(1973) (by implication); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970).
A declaratory order or ruling is generally considered to have the same status as
final agency decisions or orders in contested cases. See Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1976), and Section 8 of the Revised Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. The status of a declaratory order or ruling is not defined by
statute in Kentucky.
" E.g., Shearer v. Dailey, 226 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1950).
" E.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
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case of Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill" that prior
agency advice or action will not be binding on an agency when
it is inconsistent with the terms of a statute or agency regula-
tion. In Merrill, an Idaho farmer was advised that four hundred
acres of reseeded wheat was covered by a policy of insurance
issued by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. After a
drought destroyed the farmer's crop, the Corporation refused
to pay on the ground that its regulations prohibited insurance
for reseeded wheat. The Court allowed the agency to enforce its
own regulations despite the prior inconsistent advice, stating
that "[w]hatever the form in which the Government func-
tions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Govern-
ment takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he
who purports to act for the Government stays within the
bounds of his authority.""2 Although there are a few lower fed-
eral court decisions that repudiate the Merrill "no-estoppel"
rule, 3 it is still generally followed today." "[To the extent it
held that government agents have no authority to make mis-
takes about statutes or regulations, Merrill remains largely in-
tact.""
The Kentucky courts adopted the no-estoppel rule early.'
"Persons dealing with public officials [in Kentucky] must
take notice of their authority expressly or by necessary implica-
tion conferred upon them by law."'" In Kentucky and else-
where, it seems to make little difference whether the incorrect
advice is in writing" or whether it is given by a low-level bu-
reaucrat or the head of an agency."
I d.
,2 Id. at 384.
"See United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973); In Re La
Voie, 349 F. Supp. 68 (D. V.I. 1972).
" E.g., Automobile Club of Michigan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 353 U.S.
180 (1957); Etter Grain Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1972); Montilla v.
United States, 457 F.2d 978 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
" M. ASIMow, ADvICE To Tm PuBLIc FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcIES 41
(1973).
" E.g., Campbell County v. Braun, 174 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1943); Calvert v. Allen
County Fiscal Court, 67 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1934); Clark County Constr. Co. v. State
Highway Comm'n, 58 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1933).
"Dade Park Jockey Club v. Commonwealth, 69 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. 1934).
" Etter Grain Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1972); Calvert v. Allen
County Fiscal Court, 67 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1934).
" Compare Dade Park Jockey Club v. Commonwealth, 69 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. 1934)
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The reasoning behind the no-estoppel rule is that an
agency lacks the authority either to amend the terms of a stat-
ute or to change its own regulations except through established
rule-making procedures. Even though the no-estoppel rule may
result in substantial harm to the private party ' and "appear
to be harsh And inequitable,"10' this approach is followed since
its "abrogation would invite fraud, collusion, and unwarranted
expenditure of public funds.' ' 0 2 Here, as elsewhere, ignorance
of the law is no excuse. As stated in Calvert v. Allen County
Fiscal Court, "One dealing with public officials, boards, or
commissions must take notice of their authority to act" since
"the law charges him with knowledge of any and all limitations
upon such power."' 03
It should be noted that the Kentucky cases in point are all
very early cases. It remains to be seen whether the Kentucky
courts will follow the approach of the few recent decisions, both
federal and state, which indicate that there may be a trend
away from the blanket no-estoppel rule of Merrill.'4 In such
cases, no estoppel would have resulted in substantial harm to
the private party and the application of estoppel did not signif-
icantly impair an important public interest. Under similar cir-
cumstances, the Kentucky courts may find that "good govern-
ment" requires the application of estoppel to prevent a gross
and needless injustice. When applied conservatively on a case-
by-case basis, it seems unlikely that this approach will promote
the fraud and collusion feared in the early Kentucky cases.'0
(action by revenue agent) with Clark County Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n,
58 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1933) (action by head of agency).
'" See, e.g., Nelson v. Secretary of Agriculture, 133 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1943); SEC
v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
, Calvert v. Allen County Fiscal Court, 67 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1934).
' Clark County Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 58 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Ky.
1933).
,, 67 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1934).
" United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1972); In Re La Voie,
349 F. Supp. 68 (D. V.I. 1972); Shafer v. State of Washington, 521 P.2d 736 (Wash.
1974).
10 Compare Gestuvo v. District Director, 337 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(Immigration and Naturalization Service estopped to deny professional classification
when petitioner relied on classification and the service expected him to rely on it) with
Montilla v. United States, 457 F.2d 978 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (army reserve officer allegedly
misled to believe that he had 20 years of service, government not estopped to deny that
he had completed 20 years - officers did not have authority to waive this require-
ment).
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2. Action Within Scope of Authority
The Kentucky Court is likely to limit application of the
no-estoppel rule to those situations in which the prior advice
is directly inconsistent with the express terms of a statute or
rule, or is otherwise clearly unauthorized. A growing number of
federal decisions hold that the Government may be estopped
if the prior advice or action is not clearly inconsistent with
existing law and is within the implied scope of the employee's
or agency's authority.'" As stated in Oil Shale Corp. v. Morton,
"the government can be estopped by the conduct of its agents,
within the scope of their authority. The notion that the govern-
ment is immune from estoppel is only true when we are pre-
sented with an attempted estoppel of the government resulting
from the erroneous, illegal, or unauthorized acts of its
agents."'07
Although there appears to be no Kentucky case directly on
point, when an important public interest will not be signifi-
cantly affected, the Kentucky courts may hold, out of a sense
of justice and fair play, that estoppel is available as a defense
against agency action if the inconsistent prior agency advice
relied upon was not outside the lawful scope of the agency's
authority and substantial harm would otherwise result to the
private party.' 8 To allow the government to say, in this situa-
tion, " 'The joke is on you. You shouldn't have trusted us,' is
hardly worthy of our great nation.""'
IV. RULE-MAKING PROCEDURE
Rule-making procedure has been called "one of the great-
est inventions of modem government."110 It allows public par-
ticipation in the formation of agency policies by giving notice
to interested parties of proposed agency rules and by providing
, E.g., Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970); Lesavoy Foundation v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956); Emeco Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 485 F.2d 652 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
1" 370 F. Supp. 108, 125 (D. Colo. 1973) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
,0 A case where the no-estoppel rule was apparently applied due to the important
public interest involved is Sanitation Dist. No. 1 v. Campbell, 249 S.W.2d 767 (Ky.
1952).
N Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1970).
' K. DAvis, AnMismTRATivE LAW Tsxr 142 (2d ed. 1972).
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an opportunity for affected persons to be heard. The public
airing of problems through rule-making procedure is an at-
tempt to make bureaucracy more responsive to public needs."
It embodies the recognition that agencies are not always reposi-
tories of ultimate wisdom and that they may often benefit from
the suggestions of outsiders. Since the agency rule formulation
process has been opened up to widespread participation by
affected citizens, businesses, and special interest groups, attor-
neys are increasingly called upon to represent a broad range of
interests in such proceedings.
In 1974, the Kentucky General Assembly passed major
legislation amending the procedures for agency rule-making.
1 12
An important part of this legislation required that regulations
in effect prior to July 1, 1974, be resubmitted to the Legislative
Research Commission (LRC) by July 1, 1975, in order to be
promulgated in accordance with the new rule-making require-
ments.113 Any regulation that was not resubmitted by that date
is now rescinded and no longer valid."' State agency regula-
tions are considered effective and binding only if they have
been promulgated in accordance with all the required rule-
making procedures set out in KRS chapter 13." 5 The major
steps in the statutory rule-making scheme, in chronological
order, are as follows:
1. An agency submits the proposed regulation to the LRC.111
2. The proposed regulation is published in the
Administrative Register."7
"I For an excellent statement on this function of rule-making see NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 775 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
,,2 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 73. This legislation is now codified in KRS chapter 13.
"I KRS § 13.084 (Supp. 1976).
1 Id.
,, Id. See Christian Appalachian Project, Inc. v. Berry, 487 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Ky.
1972); Kentucky State Bd. of Business Schools v. Electronic Computer Programming
Inst., Inc., 453 S.W.2d 534, 534 (Ky. 1970).
A statute may impose additional requirements on an agency's promulgation of
regulations. KRS § 13.080(5) (Supp. 1976). No specific rule-making provisions enacted
prior to 1974 that are inconsistent with the present rule-making statutory scheme were
repealed by the 1974 legislation. KRS § 13.082(2) (Supp. 1976). A discussion of statu-
tory interpretation which supports the theory of implied amendment-as opposed to
repeal-of earlier inconsistent agency rule-making provisions is found in Ky. Oe. Ar'Y
GEN. 72-455.
, KRS § 13.085(1) (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 13.085(1)(a) (Supp. 1976).
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3. Comments are submitted to the agency and a public
hearing is held if a request is made within 30 days following
publication of the proposed rule."'
4. The proposed regulation is submitted by the LRC to the
Administrative Regulation Review Subcommittee for its re-
view and if not objected to by this subcommittee the regula-
tion is considered filed and effective)' 9
5. If the subcommittee objects to the proposed regulation
and the promulgating agency refuses to change the rule, then
the LRC forwards the proposed regulation to the appropriate
standing or interim legislative committee for its review and
if not objected to by this committee the regulation is consid-
ered filed and effective.1
2
0
6. If the standing committee objects to the proposed regula-
tion, it is returned to the promulgating agency and if the
agency refuses to change the rule, it is considered filed and
effective when resubmitted by the agency to the LRC. 11
A. "Regulation" Defined
The procedural and publication requirements in Kentucky
apply to the promulgation of any "regulation" as that term is
defined in KRS § 13.080(3). As noted earlier, this statutory
definition includes substantive rules, procedural rules, and in-
terpretive rules. 122 The term also "includes the amendment or
repeal of a prior regulation.'' 23
The statute specifically states that the term "regulation"
does not include:
a. statements concerning only the internal management of
an administrative body and not affecting private rights or
procedures available to the public, or
b. declaratory rulings, or
c. interdepartmental memoranda, or
d. statements relating to the acquisition of property for
highway purposes and statements relating to the construction
or maintenance of highways.
2 4
"' KRS § 13.085(4) (Supp. 1976).
"' KRS § 13.087 (Supp. 1976).
" KRS § 13.087(6) (Supp. 1976).
121 KRS § 13.087(7) (Supp. 1976).
In See text following note 19 supra.
"2 KRS § 13.080(3) (Supp. 1976).
124 Id.
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B. "Administrative Body" Defined
The rule-making statute in Kentucky applies to each regu-
lation issued by any "administrative body."'' 25  An
"administrative body" includes "each state board, bureau,
commission, department, division, authority, officer, or other
entity, except the legislature and the courts, authorized by law
to make regulations.
'12
The above definition by its express terms applies to every
state agency. Whether local or county agencies are included
within the phrase "or other entity" is questionable. The answer
is provided by application of the rule of statutory construction
"ejusdem generis." This rule of construction requires that com-
prehensive expressions such as "and all others" or "any others"
are restricted to persons or things of the same kind or class as
those named in the preceding words. Since this rule of con-
struction is followed by Kentucky courts,1 27 the phrase "or
other entity ' used in KRS § 13.080(1) should refer only to state
entities that are related to the categories of state boards, state
commissions, etc. and not to local or county agencies.2'
C. Publication of Notice
The LRC is required to print and publish the
Administrative Register on a monthly basis for the purpose of
giving notice of proposed regulations.2" Every proposed regula-
tion is required to be submitted to the LRC; the complete text
of the proposed rule along with required accompanying state-
ments must then be published in the Administrative
Register.'3 Each of the following must accompany the publica-
tion of any proposed regulation:
's KRS § 13.080(1) (Supp. 1976).
12 Id.
' See City of Lexington v. Edgerton, 159 S.W.2d 1015 (Ky. 1942).
12 This conclusion is consistent with the Court's decision in City of Bardstown v.
Nelson County, 78 S.W. 169 (Ky. 1904), in which the court held that a county board
of health is not a state governmental entity. See Ky. Op. ATr'y GEN. 75-595.
"2 KRS § 13.096(2) (Supp. 1976). The Administrative Register is distributed the
first day of each month and contains all proposed and emergency regulations and any
regulation that has recently become effective if received or filed by the 15th day of the
preceding month.
,3 KRS § 13.085(1) (Supp. 1976).
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a. a citation of the authority pursuant to which it, or any
part of it was adopted;
h a brief statement which sets forth the necessity for issu-
ing the regulation;
c. a summary of the functions sought to be implemented-by
the regulation; and
d. the place and manner in which interested persons may
present their views.'
D. Comment and Hearing
Each proposed regulation must be accompanied by a
statement of "the place and manner in which interested per-
sons may present their views" when the proposed rule is pub-
lished in the Administrative Register.32 The notice must in-
clude an agency address to which any interested person may
send his request for an informal hearing to comment on the
proposed rule."'
The promulgating agency is required to hold a public hear-
ing on its proposed rule if such a request is received by the
agency within 30 days following publication of the rule in the
Administrative Register.3 ' Any "person having an interest in
the subject matter" of the proposed regulation may make such
a request.' It is not required that the hearing be a formal or
trial-type adversary proceeding.' An informal legislative type,
hearing is sufficient since the statute requires only that it be
conducted in a manner "so as to provide each person who
'31 KRS §§ 13.096(2), 13.085(3) (Supp. 1976).
"' KRS § 13.096(2) (Supp. 1976).
"U 1 Ky. AmDmN. REG. 1:010 (1977). This regulation of the LRC implements its
authority to issue rules governing the manner and form in which regulations are pre-
pared. KRS § 13.090 (Supp. 1976).
'3 KRS § 13.085(4) (Supp. 1976). This statute requires that the hearing be con-
cluded within 60 days from the date the proposed regulation was first published in the
Administrative Register.
' Id. The Kentucky courts will probably hold that an "interested person" is any
person who may in fact be injured by the proposed rule, i.e., persons and businesses
regulated, consumers of the product or service regulated, or persons who have aesthetic
or environmental interests that are likely to be affected. This "injury in fact" test is
similar to that for "standing" to seek judicial review of agency action in Kentucky.
See Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Tankersley, 330 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1959).
I", See Commonwealth v. Moyers, 272 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1954) (an agency is not
required to make formal findings of fact when promulgating a regulation unless a
statute specifically so requires).
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wishes to offer a comment a fair and reasonable opportunity to
do so."'37 A transcript of the hearing need not be taken unless
a private party requests one.138 The informal hearing is not
designed to produce a record that is required to be the basis of
the agency regulation."'
However, after the hearing is concluded, the agency is ex-
pressly required by statute to give affirmative consideration to
all written and oral statements submitted regarding the pro-
posed regulation.""0 This requirement of "affirmative consider-
ation" is defined to mean that "an administrative body must
either adopt suggestions or recommendations regarding a regu-
lation or issue a concise statement setting forth the reasons for
not adopting suggestions or recommendations regarding a regu-
lation."' 4' An agency then resubmits its proposed rule, along
with any changes, to the LRC. Resubmission of a proposed rule
after a public hearing must be accompanied by a statement
summarizing the comments submitted at the hearing and by
the required statement of affirmative consideration.
1 2
Upon receipt of an agency's proposed rule after a hearing
or, if a hearing has not been requested, 30 days following publi-
cation of a proposed rule, the LRC must submit the proposed
regulation to the Administrative Regulation Review Subcom-
mittee for its review.'
E. Legislative Review
KRS § 13.087 created the Administrative Regulation Re-
view Subcommittee as a permanent subcommittee of the LRC.
The three members of this subcommittee are appointed by the
LRC for terms of two years.' Before any regulation becomes
"I KRS § 13.085(4) (Supp. 1976).
£3 Id.
, See City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971) (trial-type
hearings not required for development of legislative facts).
,, KRS § 12.084(4) (Supp. 1976).
"' KRS § 13.080(4) (Supp. 1976).
1,2 KRS § 13.085(4) (Supp. 1976); 1 Ky. ADMIN. REG. 1:010 (1977). A proposed
regulation amended by an agency after publication and hearing is not subject to
further public hearing prior to becoming effective.
' ' KRS § 13.085(b) (Supp. 1976).
£4 KRS § 13.087(1) (Supp. 1976). The subcommittee members' names can be
found at the beginning of each issue of the Administrative Register.
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effective, it must be reviewed by the subcommittee to deter-
mine if the regulation conforms to, and carries out the intent
of, the statutory authority under which it was promulgated."'
Apparently, the General Assembly intended the subcom-
mittee to serve as a legislative check on agency rule-making.
However, the subcommittee has advisory authority only and
cannot veto a proposed regulation."' As a practical matter,
however, experience indicates that the subcommittee does ex-
ercise considerable influence on promulgating agencies and
that subcommittee review may provide a significant avenue for
effective input into the final drafting of agency regulations.
If a regulation is not objected to by the subcommittee, it
is immediately considered filed and effective.' If the subcom-
mittee objects to a proposed regulation, the regulation is re-
turned to the promulgating agency and the LRC with a written
notation of the objection.1" The promulgating agency may then
revise the regulation to comply with the subcommittee's objec-
tion and return it to the subcommittee, or it may return the
proposed rule, without change, to the LRC.45 When a regula-
tion objected to by the subcommittee is returned to the LRC
without change, the director of the LRC is required to forward
the proposed rule to the appropriate standing committee of the
house of representatives and senate or to the interim commit-
tee.,50
Review by the standing committee is limited to a determi-
nation of whether a proposed regulation conforms to statutory
authority and carries out legislative intent.'' A regulation not
objected to by the standing committee is immediately consid-
ered filed and effective. If a regulation is objected to by the
'- KRS § 13.087(4) (Supp. 1976). This statute requires that the subcommittee act
on a proposed regulation within 30 days after submission to the LRC.
141 Id.
' KRS § 13.087(5) (Supp. 1976).
"A KRS § 13.087(4) (Supp. 1976).
" KRS § 13.087(5) (Supp. 1976).
' KRS § 13.087(6) (Supp. 1976).
,' Id. The statute requires that the standing committee act on a proposed regula-
tion within 30 days of the date the promulgating agency returns the rule, without
change, to the LRC. However, "if there are no authorized meetings of the standing
committees or the interim committee within such thirty (30) day period, the legislative
research commission shall take action on the returned regulation in the same manner
herein described at its next regularly scheduled meeting." Id.
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standing committee, it is forwarded with a written notation of
the objection to the director of the LRC who returns the regula-
tion to the promulgating agency. The promulgating agency
may then revise the regulation to comply with the standing
committee's objection and return to the standing committee or
it may return the proposed rule unchanged to the LRC.12 When
the proposed rule is returned, without change, to the LRC, it
is immediately considered filed and effective.' 3
F. Effective Date
Administrative regulations in Kentucky are effective im-
mediately when "filed" with the LRC after compliance with all
applicable rule-making requirements.' 54 A new or amended reg-
ulation need not be published in the Administrative Register
to become effective. However, the LRC makes a practice of
publishing new or amended regulations in the Administrative
Register immediately following the effective date of the regula-
tion. " The date such a regulation was filed and became effec-
tive can be found immediately prior to the text of the regula-
tion. The effective date of regulations published in the annual
Kentucky Administrative Regulations Service can be found
immediately following the text of the regulation.
G. Emergency Exemption
When an administrative agency determines that an emer-
gency exists, it may issue a regulation without complying with
the rule-making requirements in KRS chapter 13, provided
that the Governor issues an executive order stating that the
regulation will become effective immediately upon being filed
with the LRC.'55 A regulation so filed expires after 120 days
unless it has been promulgated in accordance with the rule-
making requirements in KRS chapter 13. The statute declares
112 KRS § 13.087(7) (Supp. 1976).
1 Id.
', KRS §§ 13.085, 13.087 (Supp. 1976).
' If a regulation is filed with the LRC after the 15th day of the month, it will be
published in the next issue after the immediately following issue.
I" KRS § 13.085(2) (Supp. 1976).
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that such emergency exemptions should be "held to a mini-
mum.,,
57
H. Certification and Judicial Notice
The director of the LRC is required to prepare a certificate
stating that the text of regulations as printed in the Kentucky
Administrative Regulations Service is correct. 5 1 One copy of
that publication with the original certificate therein is main-
tained in the office of the Secretary of State. All other copies
contain a printed copy of the certificate and constitute prima
facie evidence of the law in all courts and proceedings.
KRS § 13.105 provides, "The courts shall take judicial
notice of any regulation duly filed under the provisions of KRS
chapter 13, after the regulation has become effective."'59 Publi-
cation of a regulation in the Kentucky Administrative Regula-
tions Service or the LRC's authenticated file stamp on a rule
creates a rebuttable presumption that the rule or regulation
was adopted and filed in compliance with all the requirements
necessary to make it effective.6 0
V. VALIDITY OF REGULATION
A. Presumption of Validity
Already noted is KRS § 13.100 which provides that, in
most circumstances, there will be a rebuttable presumption
that a regulation was promulgated in accordance with all ap-
plicable rule-making requirements. Kentucky courts have
gone further than this statute and have held that agency regu-
lations will be considered in all aspects to be prima facie or
presumptively valid.'6' The person attacking the validity of a
rule must carry the burden of pleading and proving facts show-
ing the invalidity of the regulation. As stated in Hohnke v.
Commonwealth:
I" Id.
I' KRS § 13.097 (Supp. 1976).
,' KRS § 13.105 (Supp. 1976).
2k KRS § 13.100 (1970).
' E.g., Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1970); Hawkins Appli-
ance Co. v. Goebel, 284 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1955); Dicken v. Kentucky State Bd. of Educ.,
199 S.W.2d 977 (Ky. 1947).
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[T]he invalidity of an administrative rule or regulation must
be made so manifest by the one attacking it that the court
has no choice except to hold that the administrative agency
has exceeded the authority delegated. Thus he must show
that such rule or regulation is clearly inconsistent with the
statute, or that it is clearly unreasonable, or that it is clearly
inappropriate to carry out the end specified in the statute it
is intended to implement. 6 '
The cases indicate that this burden of showing the invalid-
ity of a rule is often a question of law.1 3 It is only when a
regulation is attacked as being arbitrary and not having a ra-
tional basis in fact that factual determination need to be
made. "4
B. Attacking the Validity of Regulations
Statements which declare that, for a rule to be valid, it
must be necessary,' appropriate, 66 uniform in application, '67
fair,' 8 and consistent with law, " are seldom useful in identify-
ing a successful theory for attacking the validity of an agency
regulation. More useful are grounds such as: (1) the regulation
was not promulgated in accordance with required rule-making
procedure; (2) the regulation is outside the delegated scope of
agency authority; (3) the regulation does not reasonably secure
the statutory purpose; (4) the regulation is unintelligible; and
(5) the regulation is unconstitutional.
l- 451 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Ky. 1970) (quoting 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bod-
ies and Procedures § 104(c) (1951)).
26 See, e.g., Kentucky Milk Marketing and Anti-Monopoly Comm'n v. Borden
Co., 456 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970); Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Hunter, 331 S.W.2d
280 (Ky. 1960); Henry v. Parrish, 211 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1948).
" See, e.g., City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971). For a
discussion of the nature and scope of judicial review when a regulation is attacked as
being arbitrary and without a rational basis in fact, see text accompanying notes 206-
25 infra.
65 Pitts v. Perluss, 377 P.2d 83 (Cal. 1962).
'6 Osborn Funeral Home, Inc. v. Louisiana State Bd. of Embalmers, 216 So.2d
145 (La. 1968).
"' Rosenberg v. City of Cleveland, Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 263 N.E.2d 325 (Ohio
1970).
26 Byrd v. Shell Oil Co., 178 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
' Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Ogden, 210
S.W.2d 771 (Ky. 1948).
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1. Improperly Promulgated
For a regulation to be valid it must be promulgated in
accordance with required rule-making procedure.1 0 However,
the Kentucky Court has held that a minor violation of a statu-
tory rule-making requirement would not invalidate a regula-
tion. In Christian Appalachian Project, Inc. v. Berry,"' the
plaintiff in a civil suit alleged violation of a Department of
Public Safety boating regulation which required life preservers
to be furnished in certain situations. On appeal, the Court
refused to take judicial notice of the regulation since the rule
cited, as the authority pursuant to which it was adopted, a
statute relating to partnerships in the accounting profession.
Despite this violation of rule-making procedure, the Court
stated that the regulation's "existence and its provisions would
have to be properly established at least by pleading or in proper
circumstances by evidence." ' Thus the Court is likely to view
a mere technical rule-making requirement as only directive in
nature and not mandatory for a regulation to become effective
and binding if the defect can be cured through pleading or
proof. With respect to important statutory rule-making re-
quirements such as publication of notice, comment and hear-
ing, legislative review, and effectiveness on the date of filing,
the Kentucky courts are likely to hold that complete or, at
least, substantial compliance is mandatory for a regulation to
become effective and binding.1 3
2. Outside Scope of Delegated Authority
An administrative body, having been created by statute,
119 KRS § 13.085 (Supp. 1976); Kentucky State Bd. of Business Schools v. Elec-
tronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 453 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1970); Shearer v. Daily,
226 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1950). The Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in Common-
wealth v. Moyers, 272 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1954), is not inconsistent with the above cited
proposition. That decision merely holds that a regulation may be effective and valid
even though it is not required by statute to be promulgated in accordance with usual
rule-making procedures.
' 487 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1972).
" Id. at 953. This approach to technical errors in rule-making procedure appears
to be shared by other state courts. See, e.g., Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831 (Alas.
1972) (by statute); Standard "Tote" Inc. v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 121 N.E.2d
463 (Ohio 1954).
"I See Shearer v. Dailey, 226 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1950); Louisville & Jefferson
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Ogden, 210 S.W.2d 771 (Ky. 1948).
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is authorized to exercise only those powers that have been ei-
ther expressly or impliedly conferred on it by statute. The Ken-
tucky Court has often held that the validity of a regulation
depends on the following two conditions: (1) the regulation
must be within the delegated scope of agency authority; and
(2) the scope of rule-making authority must not be limitless,
but must be fixed by a legislative standard or policy.
a. Scope of Agency Authority
The Kentucky Court has repeatedly held that for an ad-
ministrative rule to be valid it must be within the scope of
authority conferred upon the agency."' When promulgating
regulations, an agency must adhere strictly to statutory stand-
ards, policies, and limitations. 7 5 An agency may not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the legislature, but must accept
the law as enacted by that body.' As stated in Alcoholic Bev-
erage Control Board v. Hunter,
Inasmuch as the rule-making power of a public adminis-
trative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not
use either to abridge the authority given it by the legislature
or to enlarge its powers beyond the scope intended by the
legislature, statutory provisions control with respect to what
rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as
well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation
by it. 77
A regulation may not amend, alter, enlarge or limit the terms
of a legislative enactment. 
78
General statutory language describing the powers and
functions of an agency will be construed by the Kentucky
courts to be limited by express and specific powers and duties
"I E.g., Roppel v. Shearer, 321 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1959); Oertel Brewing Co. v.
Portwood, 320 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. 1959); Portwood v. Falls City Brewing Co., 318 S.W.2d
535 (Ky. 1958).
I's E.g., Henry v. Parrish, 211 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1948); Robertson v. Schein, 204
S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1947).
'7' Roppel v. Shearer, 321 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1959).
'" 331 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1960) (quoting 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bod-
ies and Procedure § 94 (1951)).
119 E.g., Roppel v. Shearer, 321 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1959); Portwood v. Falls City
Brewing Co., 318 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1958); Bloemer v. Turner, 137 S.W.2d 387 (Ky.
1939).
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that are established in the same statute.17' This rule was ap-
plied in Bloemer v. Turner, 110 in which a regulation was held
invalid which created a food labeling requirement in addition
to the labeling requirements specifically established by statute.
The Court ruled that the agency's general grant of rule-making
authority was limited by the specific labeling requirements es-
tablished by the legislature in the delegating statute. The
Court stated that if the administrator "may not by regulation
subtract, [from specific statutory requirements] then he may
not by regulation add" to such requirements."' This limitation
on an agency's authority to promulgate substantive regulations
is also applied by the Kentucky Court to agency procedural
rules. ' For instance, in Heyker v. Herbst'1 a board of educa-
tion by-law was held invalid - although the board was author-
ized by statute to adopt by-laws - since the by-law in question
was inconsistent with a specific statutory provision.
With regard to agency licensing authority, an agency in
Kentucky is not authorized to create a condition for granting
or rescinding a license in the absence of express statutory provi-
sion. " ' As stated in Robertson v. Shein, when a right to a li-
cense is granted by statute,
the officer administering such statute may not by regulation
add to the conditions of that right a condition not stated in
the statute, nor may he bar from that right a person included
within the terms of the statute, even though such inclusion
is not express, but only by judicial construction. 1
b. Legislative Standard for Agency Authority
The Kentucky Court has often held that an agency may
" Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Hunter, 331 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1960).
" 137 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1939).
" Id. at 392.
" E.g., Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 S.W.2d 361
(Ky. 1954); Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Ogden, 210
S.W.2d 771 (Ky. 1948).
" 50 S.W. 859 (Ky. 1899).
" E.g., Johnson v. Correll, 332 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1960); Robertson v. Schein, 204
S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1947); Goodpaster v. Southern Ins. Agency, Inc., 169 S.W.2d 1 (Ky.
1943).
1- 204 S.W. 954, 958 (Ky. 1947) (quoting 43 Am. JuR. Public Administrative Law
§ 53 (1942)).
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not legislate under the guise of regulation.' An agency may
promulgate a subordinate rule giving effect to a statutory pur-
pose or policy but an agency may not promulgate rules without
an ascertainable legislative standard or policy.'87 A regulation
must be within the framework of a policy that the legislature
has adequately defined.1rs "[T]he Legislature may authorize
a board or administrative officer. . . in charge of some govern-
mental affairs, to make police regulations, but it cannot abdi-
cate its own police power on any subject and confer such power
on an officer or a board to his or its uncontrolled discretion."''
9
This requirement appears to have been somewhat liberal-
ized by the Kentucky Court's adoption of the "general safe-
guards" approach to delegation issues.' A statute delegating
rule-making authority need no longer establish "adequate
standards" by its express terms."1 A statute is examined "in
terms of the practical needs of effective government, and in
terms of safeguards against abuse and injustice" and it is
struck down if there is "any real danger that it would.
abuse the responsibilities conferred upon it .... ,,192
3. Reasonableness
Agencies are allowed a great deal of discretion in formulat-
ing regulations but a regulation is invalid if it bears no reasona-
ble relation to the statutory purpose for which agency rule-
making is authorized."3 As stated in Kentucky State Board of
IU E.g., Kerth v. Hopkins County Bd. of Educ., 346 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1961).
" E.g., Henry v. Parrish, 211 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1948).
Portwood v. Falls City Brewing Co., 318 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1958).
" Goodpaster v. Southern Ins. Agency, 169 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1943).
IN The test was adopted in Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of N. Ky., Inc., 352
S.W.2d 203, 207-08 (Ky. 1961). See Ziegler, Legitimizing the Administrative State:
The Judicial Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine In Kentucky, 4 N. Ky. L.
REV. 87, 107-15 (1977).
" See Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of N. Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203, 207-208
(Ky. 1961). See also Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health v. Haunz, 451 S.W.2d
407, 408-09 (Ky. 1970).
292 Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of N. Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Ky. 1961).
"0 Kentucky State Bd. of Business Schools v. Electronic Computer Programming
Inst., Inc., 453 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1970). See City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d
173 (Ky. 1971); Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1970); Lovern v.
Brown, 390 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965); Portwood v. Falls City Brewing Co., 318 S.W.2d
534 (Ky. 1970).
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Business Schools v. Electronic Computer Programming Insti-
tute, Inc., "delegated authority cannot go beyond what is rea-
sonable in accomplishing the purposes of the Act for the ad-
ministration of which the agency was given the delegation.""'
A particular regulation will be considered reasonable if there
is a rational factual basis for believing that the regulation may
accomplish the end in view. 1 5 For example, in Portwood v.
Falls City Brewing Company,"6 a regulation of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board was attacked as being arbitrary and
unreasonable. The Board was authorized to regulate the sale
and advertising of alcoholic beverages. The regulation in ques-
tion prohibited illuminated advertisements inside a retail store
if the illumination was an integral part of the sign. The Ken-
tucky Court affirmed the circuit court's decision that the regu-
lation did not bear a reasonable relation to the statutory pur-
pose. In so ruling, the Court quoted from the circuit court's
opinion:
'[T]he illumination of the sign whether inside or outside the
advertising device bears little relation to the policing of the
sale of malt beverages. By the time the advertising device is
in view of a member of the public he has entered the retail
premises . . . for the purpose of buying beer . . . it would
appear to be of small significance whether the illumination
of an inside sign is within or without the advertising device
and so much of the regulation ... would appear to be unrea-
sonable."' 7
The Kentucky Court has held that the reasonableness of
a rule is not to be judged by the hardship that results when it
is applied to a particular person or business." 8 In Sanitation
District No. 1 v. Campbell,"' the regulation in question re-
quired all toilet facilities located on property abutting a public
sewer system to be connected with the public sewer system.
Owners of private septic tank facilities attacked the rule as
"' 453 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Ky. 1970).
IH Sanitation Dist. No. 1 v. Campbell, 249 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1952).
" 318 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1958).
", Id. at 536.
"' E.g., Lovern v. Brown, 390 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965); Sanitation Dist. No. 1 v.
Campbell, 249 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1952).
"1 249 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1952).
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being arbitrary on the ground that the existing private facilities
were in fact sanitary. The Court held that the regulation was
reasonable despite the fact that it clearly imposed a hardship
on individuals whose facilities were sanitary. The Court stated
that "although properly operated private septic tanks may af-
ford a sanitary disposal system, the publicly maintained se-
wage system of the whole community is undoubtedly better at
doing away-with potential as well as actual health menaces.' '2°
Thus a regulation may be reasonable when applied to prevent
a potentially harmful Situation even though its application
may not be necessary immediately to effectuate the purpose of
the authorizing statute.
4. Lack of Intelligibility
The Kentucky Court has used a "lack of intelligibility"
rule to hold statutes invalid. If unable, by the application of
known and accepted rules of construction, to determine a stat-
ute's meaning and intent because of the statute's vagueness,
incompleteness or contradictions, the law will be considered
inoperative and invalid.20s This "lack of intelligibility" rule has
also been applied to administrative regulations. In Bostic v.
East Construction Co.,m21 plaintiffs in a civil suit based their
claim of negligence per se on alleged violations of fire safety
standards that had been promulgated as regulations by the
state fire marshall. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the regulations in question were unintelligible due to nu-
merous cross-references and ambiguities. Noting a Kentucky
case, the court stated:
[W]here the lawmaking body, in framing a law, has not
expressed its intent intelligibly, or in language that the peo-
ple upon whom it is designed to operate or whom it affects
can understand, or from which the courts can deduce the
legislative will, the statute will be declared to be inoperative
and void."3
Id. at 772.
' Folks v. Barren County, 232 S.W.2d 1010 (Ky. 1950). Cf. Arlan's Dep't Store
v. Commonwealth, 369 S.W.2d9, 13 (Ky. 1963) (vagueness is proper ground for attack-
ing a statute).
m 497 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 715 (quoting Folks v. Barren County, 232 S.W.2d 1010, 1013 (Ky. 1950)).
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The Court concluded that "[t]hose portions of the standards
here involved simply do not possess that degree of clarity neces-
sary for validity, and therefore, do not provide a basis for negli-
gence per se." 04
5. Constitutional Grounds
An administrative regulation is open to attack on constitu-
tional grounds. Challenges may be based on federal0 5 or statess
constitutional provisions. The Kentucky Court has made it a
practice to consider case law dealing with challenges to statutes
when ruling on the constitutionality of regulations." 7 It should
be noted that there is some overlap between constitutional at-
tacks on regulations and the previously discussed grounds of
attack. 0
" 497 F.2d at 716.
' See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978) (state
regulation imposed unreasonable burden on interstate commerce).
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moyers, 272 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1954) (regulation
attacked as being in violation of Ky. CONST. § 59 which prohibits special legislation).
2 See Kentucky Milk Marketing and Anti-Monopoly Comm'n v. Borden Co., 456
S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970) (regulation attacked as beingunconstitutionally vague and an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Southern Displays, Inc. v. Ward, 414
S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1967) (regulation attacked as being unconstitutionally vague); Com-
monwealth v. Moyers, 272 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1954) (regulation attacked as being in
violation of Ky. CONST. § 59 prohibiting special legislation). The federal courts also use
the same constitutional provisions when examining regulations as they do when exam-
ining statutes. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978).
2" The "legislative standards for agency authority" branch of the scope attack,
see notes 186-92 supra and accompanying text, is, in effect, a constitutional attack
while the "lack of intelligibility" and "reasonableness" grounds of attack are very
similar to constitutional grounds sometimes used to challenge statues.
The "no legislative standard for agency authority" or "lack of safeguards" attack
is a claim that the agency is exercising unbridled legislative authority in violation of
sections 27, 28 and 29 of the Kentucky Constitution which insure separation of powers.
Challenging a regulation on the ground that it is not reasonably adopted to accom-
plish the legislative purpose for which it is authorized is conceptually similar to an
alleged violation of substantive due process under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. A statute does not violate due process if there
is an important governmental purpose underlying the statute and that purpose is
served well by the statute. See e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932,
1936 (1977) and Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).* The difference
between the two methods of attack is that the Kentucky reasonableness test assumes
the validity of the purpose of the authorizing statute and concentrates on the reasona-
bleness of the regulation to accomplish that purpose. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. of
Business Schools v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 453 S.W.2d 534, 536
(Ky. 1970); Portwood v. Falls City Brewing Co., 318 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Ky. 1958).
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C. Judicial Review
1. Scope of Review
When the validity of an administrative regulation is chal-
lenged, only pure questions of law are likely to be at issue. A
reviewing judge or court will exercise independent judgment
when ruling on these questions of law."9 Such is the case when
a regulation is attacked on the grounds that it was improperly
promulgated, outside the scope of delegated authority, unintel-
ligible, or unconstitutional.
When a regulation is attacked on the ground that it is
arbitrary and unreasonable, the reviewing judge or court may
not exercise its own judgment regarding whether the regulation
in question is wise or even necessary under the particular regu-
latory scheme.210 When deciding this issue, the reviewing court
must defer to agency experience and expertise and apply a
much more limited scope of review. The scope of review will
depend on whether the procedure required for promulgating
the regulation is formal or informal.
a. Informal Rule-Making
When the regulation in question is not required to be pro-
mulgated after a trial-type hearing, that is, when only informal
notice and comment procedures are required,' the scope of
judicial review will be limited to the question of whether there
is "any rational basis in fact" connecting the substance of the
rule with the intent or purpose of the authorizing statute.22 For
The lack of intelligibility challenge is a principle of statutory construction in
Kentucky but to the extent the principle requires an enactment to give sufficient notice
of prohibitions to private citizens it is identical to attacking an enactment as being
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the fifth or fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution.
2" See, e.g., Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Hunter, 331 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1960);
Henry v. Parrish, 211 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1948).
'1 Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1970).
211 See KRS § 13.085.
212 E.g., Graybeal v. McNevin, 439 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1969). This is also the scope
of review generally followed by the federal courts in reviewing informal rule-making.
See, e.g., Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975). However, some federal statutes require that the
"substantial evidence" scope of review be applied to informal rule-making. Associated
Industries of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir.
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example, in Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 2 1 a regulation listing
LSD as a narcotic drug was attacked on the ground that LSD
did not possess the qualities described by the authorizing stat-
ute that were necessary for a substance to be listed as a
"narcotic drug." The Court held that a reviewing court could
not substitute its judgment for that of the promulgating
agency; it must uphold the agency's finding of fact unless the
agency finding is "clearly unreasonable. '214 A regulation is
clearly unreasonable only when the regulation has "no reasona-
ble basis in fact." '15 In City of Louisville v. McDonald, the
Court stated that "[an agency's] action is arbitrary if there is
no rational connection between that action and the purpose for
which the body's power to act exists" and that if "the existence
of such a rational connection is 'fairly debatable' the action will
not be disturbed by a court. '21 In this case, the Court made it
clear that this "rational basis in fact" scope of review is a more
limited inquiry than the "substantial evidence" standard of
review applicable to formal rule-making where a trial-type
hearing is required. 217 That is, after informal rule-making a
regulation is valid if there is a rational basis in fact supporting
the rule but after formal rule-making a rule is valid only if the
rational basis for the rule is supported by "substantial evi-
dence" in the record of the trial-type formal proceeding.
2'8
Unless a statute so requires, an agency in Kentucky need
not make formal findings of fact when a regulation is promul-
gated219 and the agency does not have the burden of proving
that a rational basis exists. The person attacking the validity
of the rule must convince the reviewing court that the regula-
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 942 (1974). See generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OF THE SEVENIEs § 29.01-3 (1976). The court, of course, may exercise its own indepen-
dent judgment on questions of law.
213 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1970).
211 Id. at 166 (quoting 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure §
104(c) (1951)).
215 Graybeal v. McNevin, 439 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Ky. 1969).
211 470 S.W.2d 173, 187 (Ky. 1971).
217 Id. at 177-78.
211 See Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Charlton v. United
States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969) (Stahl, J., concurring).
2,, Commonwealth v. Moyers, 272 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1954). But KRS § 13.085(3)
(Supp. 1976) does require that a regulation filed with the LRC be accompanied by "a
brief statement which sets forth the necessity for issuing the regulation."
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tion in question has no rational basis in fact.22 To provide the
opportunity for doing so, the courts in Kentucky have allowed
the party attacking the regulation to call experts to present
extensive testimony on the issue.221 However, the Kentucky
Court has indicated that the reviewing court must not decide
the question exclusively on the basis of the evidence in the
court record thereby developed.222 The reviewing court must
give great weight to any facts that were before the agency when
it promulgated the rule.22 Such facts may be presented by the
agency through pleading, affidavits, or, in an unusual case,
testimony. In many cases, the reviewing court might properly
choose to limit its review to pleadings and the "record" of the
informal rule-making. It has been suggested that the "record"
in informal rule-making consists of: (1) the notice of proposed
rule-making and any documents referred to therein; (2) com-
ments and other documents submitted by interested persons;
(3) transcripts, if any, of oral presentations; (4) factual infor-
mation considered by the agency but not included in the fore-
going that is proffered by the agency; and (5) the agency's
brief statement regarding the necessity of the rule and any
documents referred to therein.224 Though a court may choose to
review informal rule-making on the rule-making "record" de-
scribed above, a court is not likely to consider the agency
bound to the facts and comments therein if a regulation in-
volving a broad policy determination is involved. In such a
case, it may be sufficient that the regulation is supported by
agency experience and expertise since the issue is likely to be
more a question of subjective judgment than a question of veri-
fiable fact.2
m The Kentucky Court has held that there is a presumption of the existence of
facts justifying an administrative regulation. Commonwealth v. Moyers, 272 S.W.2d
670 (Ky. 1954).
2' See, e.g., Graybeal v. McNevin, 439 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1969); Lovern v. Brown,
390 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965).
2u Graybeal v. McNevin, 439 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Ky. 1969) (dictum).
2 Id.
22, United States Administrative Conference Recommendation 74-4, 1 CFR §
305.74-4 (1978). See generally Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85
YALE L.J. 38 (1975).
n3 E.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
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b. Formal Rule-Making
When the regulation in question was required to be pro-
mulgated after a formal hearing on the record, the standard for
judicial review of facts supporting the rule will usually be
"substantial evidence." ''2 In such a case the court will limit its
review to the record of the formal hearing conducted by the
agency. The party attacking the regulation must persuade the
reviewing court that there is not substantial evidence in the
record to support the alleged factual basis of the regulation in
question. The substantial evidence test is met in Kentucky if
there is enough legally competent evidence in the agency record
to lead a reasonable person to make the agency's factual find-
ings. 2m
2. Preenforcement Judicial Review
The Kentucky courts allow preenforcement judicial review
of substantive administrative regulations through the remedies
of injunction and declaratory judgment.221 In Harrison's Sani-
tarium, Inc. v. Commonwealth,2 the Court held that preen-
forcement judicial review of administrative regulations will
generally be allowed except when there are "factual circum-
" A formal hearing is usually thought necessary when a statute provides for
judicial review based on a "substantial evidence" standard and limited to the record
of a required agency hearing. Formal rule-making on the record is not uncommon at
the federal level. In Kentucky, formal rule-making is rare, but it is provided for by
specific statutory provisions in some instances. For example, KRS § 281.625 (Supp.
1976) requires a formal hearing by the Bureau of Vehicle Regulation prior to the
issuance of an order removing a commodity from the Bureau's exempted commodities
list. KRS § 281.785 (1972) requires substantial evidence judicial review on the record
of the agency hearing. Such an "order" is clearly a "regulation" as that term is defined
in Kentucky's general rule-making statute, KRS § 13.085 (Supp. 1976).
Although the traditional phrase "formal hearing" is used here, in recent years
many courts have held that the "hearing" required by statute need not always be a
trial-type proceeding with cross-examination. This trend is beneficial since trial-type
proceedings are designed to resolve a specific issue of fact and are usually not helpful
in deciding the broad questions of policy that are sometimes required regarding stat-
utes. See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
22 E.g., Big Sandy Community Action Program v. Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d 526 (Ky.
1973).
2m E.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health v. Haunz, 451 S.W.2d 407
(Ky. 1969); Lovem v. Brown, 390 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1975).
417 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1967).
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stances in dispute, or which create uncertainty .. . ."I" The
Court reasoned that once a regulation is promulgated it is final
and ripe for review and that exhaustion of prospective adminis-
trative remedies is likely to be futile and inadequate.
If a person immediately affected by a regulation must either
comply with it or violate it and await the consequences he
simply does not have a reasonable, and therefore adequate,
alternative to initiating a challenge in court. Especially is
this so when. . a violation subjects him to criminal sanc-
tions as well as forfeitures of his license . . . He cannot
reasonably be expected to live indefinitely under a sword of
Damocles.2'
In such a situation, irreparable injury need not be shown for
temporary injunctive relief to be granted, at least if no emer-
gency exists and the public interest is not "likely to suffer from
a stay of enforcement pending disposition of [the merits] .'2
It should be noted that in Harrison's Sanitarium, the
Court did state that actions to review regulations should not be
entertained by courts when taken to "precipitate a resolution
of the controversy through administrative proceedings" or
when the agency involved has initiated administrative pro-
ceedings "to penalize or revoke the license of" the plaintiff for
violating the regulation in question.Y'
D. Collateral Attack In Judicial Proceedings
The Kentucky Court ordinarily allows administrative reg-
ulations to be collaterally attacked in a civil suit if negligence
per se is an issue25 and in a criminal enforcement proceeding
21 Id. at 139. For a case in which the Kentucky Court refused to review a compli-
cated factual question in a preenforcement action, see Kentucky Milk Marketing and
Anti-Monopoly Comm'n v. Borden Co., 456 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970).
"1 417 S.W.2d at 139. The leading federal case discussing this issue is Abbot
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
2" Harrison's Sanitarium, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 417 S.W.2d 137,139 (Ky. 1967).
For considerations generally applicable to the granting of temporary injunctive relief
in Kentucky, see Oscar Ewing, Inc. v. Melton, 309 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. 1958).
233 417 S.W.2d at 139. See also Pritchett v. Marshall, 375 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1963);
Kendall v. Beiling, 175 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1943).
211 417 S.W.2d at 139. Cf. Heyser v. Brown, 184 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1945).
211 E.g., Bostic v. East Construction Co., 497 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1974); Linkous v.
Darch, 323 S.W. 850 (Ky. 1959).
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if a fine or jail term is sought to be imposed for violation of a
regulation. 26 The question of validity is a preliminary defense
presented by motion. 7 An evidentiary hearing on the motion
is permitted if the issue is not a pure question of the law.25
In Hohnke v. Commonwealth,3 9 the Kentucky Court, in
allowing the invalidity of a regulation to be raised as a defense
in a criminal proceeding, held: "It may not be doubted that a
judicial review to test the validity of an administrative regula-
tion must be afforded to satisfy the demands of due process.
1240
If an express statutory provision provides for judicial review of
the regulation at an earlier proceeding,21 and if that earlier
proceeding is intended by the legislature to be the exclusive
method for review of the regulation, the Kentucky Court might
well hold that due process does not require a second opportun-
ity to challenge the validity of the rule.22 The U.S. Supreme
Court expressly held in Yakus v. United States"3 that a defen-
dant in a criminal case has no due process right to attack the
validity of the rule he is charged with violating if an earlier and
separate procedure for judicial review of the rule was provided
for by statute and such procedure was intended to be the exclu-
sive method of review. In so holding, the Court stated: "We are
pointed to no principle of law or provision of the Constitution
which precludes Congress from making criminal the violation
of an administrative regulation, by one who has failed to avail
himself of an adequate separate procedure for the adjudication
of its validity . . . . "''i The U.S. Supreme Court has never
repudiated the fundamental principle of Yakus, and that deci-
m Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1970); Commonwealth v.
Moyers, 272 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1954).
I" See cases cited in note 234 supra. The motion in a civil case is pursuant to Ky.
R. Civ. P. 12.02 and in a criminal case pursuant to Ky. R. Ciun. P. 8.12, 8.14.
z1 See Graybeal v. McNevin, 439 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1969); Lovern v. Brown, 390
S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965).
-' 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1970).
20 Id. at 166.
242 An example of such a provision in Kentucky is KRS § 281.785 (1972), which
provides for judicial review of a Bureau of Vehicle Regulation order removing an item
from the Bureau's exempted commodities list.
242 The Kentucky Court in Hohnke expressly noted the absence of any separate
review proceeding for attacking the regulation in question.
2- 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
2. Id. at 444.
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sion, though criticised in a few lower court opinions,245 is still
generally followed as the governing law on the issue.
2
11
VI. AGENCY DIsCRETION: REQUIRING REGULATIONS
For many years, it was a well-settled administrative law
principle that the choice of whether to implement a statutory
policy by rule-making or by case-by-case adjudication was a
decision within the discretion of the agency.u 7 While the princi-
ple is still applicable in many cases,248 on an increasing number
of occasions the courts have required agencies to promulgate
rules to limit and guide the agency in the exercise of its dele-
gated responsibilities. 211 These judicial efforts have been an
attempt to ensure that a framework for principled decision-
making exists as a safeguard against the arbitrariness likely to
result when agency discretion is exercised on an apparently
standardless ad hoc basis.
One available remedy when a state agency is adjudicating
with respect to a protected property interest and there are no
established standards controlling its discretion is a section 1983
action.25 In the landmark decision of Hornsby v. Allen,2 11 the
Fifth Circuit, relying on section 1983, enjoined the denial of
liquor license application by officials in the city of Atlanta
because of the absence of standards controlling their licensing
decisions. In Hornsby, the plaintiff, who was an unsuccessful
applicant for a retail liquor license, charged that a system of
ward courtesy controlled licensing decisions. The circuit court
held that "the public has the right to expect its officers to
observe prescribed standards and to make adjudication on the
basis of merit. 2 5 Due process required that an applicant be
2' See, e.g., United States v. England, 347 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1965).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Parra, 438 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 1010 (1971).
247 See, e.g., SEC v. Shenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1949).
21M See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
24 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATV LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 6.13 (1976) for important
federal cases on this subject.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In such suits, prospective state administrative and
judicial remedies generally need not be exhausted. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL
CouRTs (3d ed. 1976).
1" 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
212 Id. at 610.
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"afforded an opportunity to know, through reasonable regula-
tions promulgated by the board, of the objective standards
which had to be met to obtain a license."
'2 3
The Hornsby rationale has been followed by other federal
courts;2 M the decisions have required agency rule-making in
such areas as student discipline,2 prisioners' rights,25 and
applications for public housing.27 Indicative of this developing
view is the statement by one federal court that "[o]ne essen-
tial element of a properly made decision is that it accords with
previously stated, clearly articulate rules and standards. This
is so because there is a tendency for regulatory systems which
operate without clearly enunciated standards to be inherently
irrational and arbitrary."
'5
Compared to this rather recent development in other
states and in the federal courts, the Kentucky Court adopted
the notion quite early that agencies might be required to artic-
ulate and to establish definite standards instead of implement-
ing a regulatory scheme on a case-by-case basis.2 9
Perhaps the most important Kentucky case on point is
Deckert v. Levy.21° In Deckert, the Court, in a well-reasoned
opinion, held that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board was
without authority to issue a retail beer license which exceeded
a local quota fixed by a city in the absence of a Board regula-
tion specifying a larger quota. The Court stated:
Without promulgation of rules and conditions there is no
guidance either for the officers or the public, particularly for
those who come or desire to come within the operation of the
statute. Without such standards, there is a departure from
the basic principle of a government "of laws and not of men."
... It is going too far to say that such an administrative
= Id.
2" E.g., White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bryant,
439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
211 Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
25 Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 396
(1975).
2 Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
In Harnett v. Board of Zoning, Subdivision and Bldg. Appeals, 350 F. Supp. 1159,
1161 (D. V.I. 1972).
13 See, e.g., Matthews v. Murphy, 63 S.W. 785 (Ky. 1901).
2" 213 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1948).
1978-791
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
board or individual officer may act in contravention of local
legislation, without having laid down any standard, estab-
lished any rule or adopted any stable regulation. They may
not act in a given case according to caprice or the whim of
the moment, giving a right to one and denying the same to
another."'
Two 1973 Kentucky cases evidence the same judicial dis-
satisfaction shown in Deckert for ad hoc agency decisionmak-
ing. In Dolan v. Shoppers Village Liquors No. 2, Inc.,261 the
Court held that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board could
not refuse to grant a license on the ground that it was author-
ized by statute to limit the number of licenses since the board
had not implemented the authority granted by promulgating
regulations. Similarly, in Big Sandy Community Action Pro-
gram v. Chaffins,21 3 discussing the admissibility of evidence
before the Workmen's Compensation Board, the Court stated
that lawyers are entitled to know the rules under which they
are expected to practice and that "the board should specify in
the form of a standing regulation whether the same rules of
evidence will apply in compensation hearings as in judicial
proceedings, and, if not, just what it will hear and consider that
is not admissible in court." '
There are three grounds that Kentucky courts might rely
upon to require that standards be articulated for the guidance
of both the agency and the public: (1) section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which prohibits the existence of arbitrary power
within the Commonwealth; 215 (2) the "general safeguards" del-
egation test recently adopted by the Kentucky Court which
might well require that regulations establish standards when
meaningful standards are not contained in a delegating stat-
ute;2" and (3) the existing common law in Kentucky.
2 7
2 Id. at 433.
212 492 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1973).
26 502 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1973).
264 Id. at 531.
20 Ky. CONST. § 2 states: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority."
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing has been an attempt to set out the basic
statutory and case law in Kentucky regarding administrative
rules and rule-making. As indicated in section IV of this article,
Kentucky has enacted a comprehensive procedure for agency
rule-making process that does not interfere with effective
agency implementation of delegated responsibilities. However,
in order more fully to achieve agency responsiveness in rule-
making and fairness to persons affected by agency regulations,
further legislation should be enacted to incorporate the follow-
ing three provisions into the statutory scheme: 1) a procedure
should be provided whereby interested persons could formally
petition agencies for enactment, amendment or repeal of a reg-
ulation and agencies should be required to give affirmative
consideration to such petitions and respond in writing within
a reasonable time;26 2) a procedure should be provided
whereby interested persons could formally petition agencies for
issuance of a declaratory. order affording advance determina-
tion of the applicability of a statute or regulation to a particu-
lar factual situation and agencies should be required to give
affirmative consideration to such petitions and respond in writ-
ing within a reasonable time; 267 and 3) agency regulations
should not become effective until they are published in The
Administrative Register.
2
1
Also, Kentucky's simplification of rule-making procedure
should be extended to all phases of state administrative law.
In 1972, the General Assembly considered an exhaustive senate
bill21 that would have adopted, for the most part, the Uniform
State Administrative Procedure ActY0 While analysis of the
merits of particular provisions of this senate bill or of the Uni-
form State Act is beyond the scope of this article, the value of
comprehensive legislation governing agency investigations,
adjudicatory hearings, and judicial review of agency decisions
is obvious to attorneys who practice before different state agen-
cies. Although many of the procedural details involved in any
2 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976).
21 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1976).
m Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976).
219 Ky. S. 218, 1972 General Assembly.
... UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' REvIsED MODEL STATE ADMINIsTRATIvE PROCE-
DURE ACT (1970).
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administrative action are wisely left to agency discretion, there
are certain basic principles of common sense, justice, and fair-
ness that can and should be required of all agencies.Y The
enactment of a comprehensive administrative procedure act
would surely be a step toward assuring that the development
of administrative government in Kentucky does not result in
the rule of law being replaced by "the breadth of the chancel-
lor's foot."
"I For a statement by the U.S. Supreme Court of the procedures ordinarily re-
quired by due process in adjudicatory hearings, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
